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Abstract
Most classical tests of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) based
on individual portfolio composition use cross sectional data. Such
tests must assume that the distributions of wealth and preferences are
independent. We use panel data to analyze how individuals’ portfo-
lio allocation between risky and riskless assets varies in response to
changes in total ﬁnancial wealth. We ﬁnd the elasticity of the risky
asset share to wealth to be small and statistically insigniﬁcant, sup-
porting the CRRA assumption; this ﬁnding is robust when the sample
is restricted to households experiencing ‘large’ income variations. Var-
ious extensions are discussed.
∗Paper presented at a seminar at Dartmouth College. Helpful comments from the
participants and from Tano Santos are gratefully acknowledged. Only the authors are
responsible for the contents of this paper.
11 Introduction
Assuming time-separable, homogeneous preferences characterized by con-
stant relative risk aversion (CRRA) is a standard practice in macroeconomic
and asset pricing models. The CRRA utility function has a scale invariance
property: if investment opportunity sets are constant, (relative) risk premia
do not change over time as aggregate wealth and the size of the economy in-
crease.1 An additional property is that if investors have the same coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion but diﬀerent wealth levels, they will allocate to risky
assets the same fraction of their respective wealth; moreover, they can be
aggregated into a single representative agent with the same utility function.
This provides a justiﬁcation for the use of aggregate, rather than individ-
ual consumption in the empirical appraisal of models studying intertemporal
choices.
In recent years, the CRRA assumption has been questioned, in particular
because the standard approach just described was unable to explain a num-
ber of empirical ‘puzzles’. However, despite the analytic importance of risk
aversion and the abundant debates the ‘puzzles’ have generated,2 the em-
pirical evidence regarding the actual shape of agents’ preferences is scarce.
Most empirical studies simply assume constant relative risk aversion.3 What
is known on how risk aversion changes with wealth comes mainly from the
analysis of household-level data on asset holdings, and speciﬁcally from con-
tributions like Friend and Blume (1975), Cohn et al. (1975), Blake (1996),
Morin and Fernandez Suarez (1983) and Guiso and Paiella (2001) that study
how portfolio composition changes with individual wealth. A important as-
pect of this approach is that in a context of recursive utility a la Epstein-Zin
(1989, 1991), in which risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of sub-
stitution are governed by distinct parameters, portfolio composition only de-
pends on risk aversion and not on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
1Grossman and Shiller (1982) show in a continuous-time model that this result gen-
eralizes to a model with uninsurable idiosynchratic risks if consumption and asset prices
follow diﬀusion processes.
2See Kocherlakota (1996) for a beautiful summary.
3This is the case, for instance, of most studies based on consumption dynamics, which
focus on the relationship between the rate of growth of consumption and real interest rates.
See Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Hansen and Singleton (1982) for early analysis and
Attanasio et al. (2002), Vissing Jorgensen (2002) and Attanasio and Vissing Jorgensen
(2003) for recent contributions.
2as demonstrated by Svensson (1989).4 The approach is thus compatible with
and complementary to the growing literature aimed at distinguishing between
the two concepts (see Attanasio and Weber, 1989, for an early attempt, and
Attanasio and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003, and Gomes and Michaelides, 2005,
for recent contributions).
Most works on portfolio composition, however, share a common weak-
ness: they rely on cross sectional data on portfolio composition. If, however,
preferences are heterogeneous, the cross sectional distribution of the share
of risky assets in individuals portfolios depends not only on the shape of
individual preferences but also on the joint distribution of wealth and risk
aversion in the population under consideration. Disentangling the two ef-
f e c t si si m p o s s i b l ei nt h ea b s e n c eo ft i m ev a r i a t i o n s . I naw o r l di nw h i c h
all agents have CRRA preferences, but less risk averse agents are wealthier
on average (say, because they have received high returns on previous risky
investments), the cross sectional correlation between wealth and the share
of risky assets in the portfolio is positive, a pattern usually associated with
decreasing relative risk aversion (DRRA). We actually prove below that any
given joint distribution of wealth and portfolio composition can be made
compatible with an arbitrary form for individual preferences by the choice of
an adequate joint distribution of wealth and preferences in the population.
Since such a distribution is unobservable, cross sectional evidence alone tells
exactly nothing on the shape of preferences. This conclusion is reversed if
one is willing to make the additional assumption that the distribution of risk
aversion is independent of wealth. Then the shape of preferences (or, techni-
cally, the function giving the share of risky assets for any given wealth level)
can be recovered up to a scale normalization. However, the independence
assumption is strong, ad hoc, and non testable.
Clearly, further progress on this issue requires richer data sets. The goal
of this note is precisely to use panel data to revisit the problem. Panel data
allow to estimate a ﬁrst-diﬀerence model, hence to eliminate the eﬀects of
preference heterogeneity by concentrating on the impact of changes in an
investor’s wealth on the structure of the portfolio detained by this investor.
One can also control for aggregate shocks that might aﬀect asset prices, re-
turns or volatility, and condition on current and past risky asset holdings,
4This property may however fail to hold when the investment opportunity set is itself
stochastic and non iid, see Bhamra and Uppal (2006) (we thank Tano Santos for this
reference).
3since entry/exit decisions are likely to involve issues other than the atti-
tude towards risk, such as ﬁxed costs of participation (see Paiella, 2007, and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003). Finally, the availability of detailed information on
socio-demographic characteristics allows us to control for life-cycle changes
aﬀecting directly both portfolio shares and wealth levels.5 In summary, panel
data allow to disentangle two phenomena - the variation of risk aversion with
wealth at the individual level and the population-wide correlation between
wealth and preferences - that are indistinguishable on cross sectional data.
With such data, one can directly test for CRRA; and if CRRA is not re-
jected, one can then estimate the correlation between individual wealth and
individual relative risk aversion.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that individuals’ relative risk aversion is indeed con-
stant. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant response of portfolio structure to changes in
ﬁnancial wealth. Our coeﬃcient estimates are very small and precisely esti-
mated; our conclusions are robust to various extensions (for instance consid-
ering only agents experiencing ‘large’ wealth variations) and to the introduc-
tion of diﬀerent sets of controls.
A second ﬁnding is that the inclusion of business equity in our measure of
an investor’s risky assets reverses our conclusion: we ﬁnd evidence of a posi-
tive elasticity of risky asset shares to wealth. Further investigation suggests
that the main explanation for this result is the illiquidity of business equity
holdings. Indeed, when considering agents who simultaneously hold business
equity and risky ﬁnancial assets, we ﬁnd that increases in wealth are associ-
ated with a raise in the share of business equity but also with a signiﬁcant
decline in the share of other risky ﬁnancial assets, suggesting the type of port-
folio reallocation implied by theory in the presence of illiquid business equity
holdings. Our evidence thus supports the business equity puzzle discussed by
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). Finally, when housing in included
in the risky wealth measure, the impact of wealth variations over the share
of risky assets becomes signiﬁcantly negative. However, whether housing, as
an asset, should be considered as risky or safe is somewhat unclear.
Finally, our approach allows to independently test for the CRRA assump-
5After having completed this paper, we became aware of a recent work by Brunnermeier
and Nagel (2005) adopting an approach similar to ours. However, the main focus of the
two papers is distinct. Brunnermeier and Nagel use a panel of US households to test for
wealth dependent risk aversion. In addition to testing the CRRA hypothesis, we provide a
f o r m a lp r o o fo fn o n - i d e n t i ﬁcation of the form of individual preferences from cross-sectional
data and estimate the cross-sectional distribution of risk aversion.
4tion and to identify the joint distribution of wealth and risk aversion. The
knowledge of this distribution is important per se, if only because it plays
a key role in the cost-beneﬁt analysis of any policy aimed at reducing risks
or improving insurance possibilities at the individual level (see Chiappori,
2006, for a precise discussion). Our ﬁrst, robust ﬁnding is that the distribu-
tion of relative risk aversion across households is heterogeneous.6 Secondly,
assuming that agents face identical investment sets, the distribution of the
shares of risky assets coincides with that of the risk aversion coeﬃcients up
to a multiplicative factor which in turn depends on the ﬁnancial characteris-
tics of the market portfolio. Using a rough estimation of this factor, we can
recover an approximation of the joint distribution of wealth and risk aver-
sion of households with positive risky asset holdings. In particular, we ﬁnd
as i g n i ﬁcant correlation between wealth and the share of risky assets, sug-
gestive of a negative correlation between risk aversion and wealth. Hence, in
our data, cross-sectional regressions of portfolio shares on wealth would lead
to the spurious conclusion that relative risk aversion is slightly decreasing.
However, the coeﬃcient, although signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, is small;
the independence assumption can thus be seen as a good approximation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a formal
proof of non identiﬁcation from cross sectional data. Section 3 sets out our
empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 presents and
discusses the empirical results.
2 Identifying preferences From Cross Sectional
Data: a Formal Analysis
An e g a t i v er e s u l t We begin by showing that without a priori restrictions
on the joint distribution of wealth and preferences, the form of individual
preferences simply cannot be recovered from cross sectional data. In fact,
any form of individual preferences is compatible with any observed, joint dis-
tribution of wealth and risky asset shares provided that one can freely choose
the joint distribution of wealth and preferences. To substantiate this claim,
we shall take an arbitrary, continuous family of individual preferences, and
6This result is in line with a number of other studies, for instance Barski et al. (1997),
Guiso and Paiella (2001), Halek and Eisenhauer (2001), Cohen and Einav (2005) and
Chiappori and Salanié (2006).
5we shall show how to construct a joint distribution of wealth and preferences
that would generate any given joint distribution of wealth and risky assets
shares in the population.
Consider an economy with a continuum of individuals endowed with some
wealth w and whose preferences, denoted Pλ,c a nb ei n d e x e db yas i n g l e
parameter λ (whose support is normalized to be (0,1)). We ﬁr s ti m p o s ea
monotonicity assumption on the family of preferences:
Assumption M (Monotonicity): Risk aversion is monotonic in λ,i n
the sense that whenever λ
0 >λ , the preferences indexed by λ
0 are less risk
averse than those indexed by λ in the Arrow-Pratt sense.
The demand side of this economy is thus fully deﬁned by the family
(Pλ,λ∈ (0,1)) and the joint distribution of wealth and preferences, i.e. of
(λ,w).
The economy has one riskless and one risky asset; the expected return
on the risky asset is strictly larger than that on the riskless asset. The
optimal portfolio of an individual with wealth w and preferences Pλ includes
a proportion of risky asset, which we denote by α(λ,w). By standard results,
α is increasing in λ. We make the following assumption:
Assumption CFS (Continuity and Full Support): The function







In words, Assumption CFS requires that the family (Pλ,λ∈ (0,1)) is
continuous and large enough to include a wide range of risk aversion levels
(preferences must tend to risk neutrality when λ tends to one, and to inﬁnite
risk aversion when λ tends to zero). For instance, the family of CRRA (resp.
CARA) functions with a coeﬃcient of relative (resp. absolute) risk aversion
equal to −logλ satisﬁes both assumptions.
Monotonicity and full support imply that the function α is invertible in
λ;w ec a nd e ﬁne its inverse β by
α[β (a,w),w] ≡ a.
Any given joint distribution of wealth and preferences generates a joint
distribution of wealth and shares of risky asset in the population under con-
sideration. The latter distribution is empirically observable; i.e., for each
6individual, one can observe both her wealth and the share of it she invests
in the risky asset. Let f (w) denote the marginal distribution of w in the
population, and F (a,w) the cumulative distribution of a conditional on w:
F (a, ¯ w)=P r[ α ≤ a | w =¯ w].
Our ﬁrst claim is the following:
Proposition 1 Take an arbitrary family of preferences (Pλ,λ∈ (0,1)) sat-
isfying Assumptions M and CFS. For any given, joint distribution of wealth
and risky asset shares, deﬁned by F and f, we can construct a joint distrib-
ution of wealth and preferences, deﬁned by a density φ(λ,w),t h a tg e n e r a t e s
it.
Note that the one-dimensionality of the preference distribution should be
seen as a constraint imposed on the construction; obviously, increasing the
space of possible distributions (for instance by allowing multi dimensional
heterogeneity) can only facilitate our task.
We now proceed to show the Proposition. Note, ﬁrst, that the marginal
of φ with respect to wealth must coincide with f.M o r e o v e r ,
Pr[α ≤ a | w =¯ w]=P r [ λ ≤ β (a, ¯ w) | w =¯ w] (1)
=
R β(a, ¯ w)
0 φ(λ, ¯ w)dλ
R 1










Φ[β (a,w),w]=f (w)F (a,w).












Since the joint distribution of preferences and wealth is unobservable, we
conclude that it is impossible to recover the form of individual preferences
from cross-sectional data. The variation of risk aversion with wealth at the
individual level cannot be disentangled from the population-wide correlation
between risk aversion and wealth. It follows that an empirical analysis based
on cross sectional data must rely on assumptions regarding either the shape
of preferences or the correlation between wealth and risk aversion. In the
next subsections we brieﬂy review these two approaches.
The case of known preferences Fist, let us assume that the form of
preferences (as summarized by the function the function α(λ,w))i sk n o w n .
Then the previous argument shows that the joint distribution of preferences
and wealth is exactly identiﬁed. For instance, if agents have VNM preferences




where B = A−1. It follows that Φ is characterized by:
Φ(λ,w)=f (w)F (A(λ),w).
Note, however, that since this procedure works for any type of preferences,
the assumption made regarding the shape of preferences is not testable from
such data.
Identiﬁcation under independence Alternatively, one may make as-
sumptions on the joint distribution of wealth and preferences. Consider, for
instance, the following:
Assumption I (Independence): The distribution of risk aversion and
wealth are independent:
φ(λ,w)=ψ(λ)f (w), ∀(λ,w).
8Under Assumption I, (1) becomes:
F (a, ¯ w)=P r[ λ ≤ β (a, ¯ w) | w =¯ w]=P r[ λ ≤ β (a, ¯ w)].
Clearly, the distribution of λ is arbitrary: if its CDF is Λ, the family
of preferences under consideration can equivalently be indexed by λ or by
λ
0 = Λ(λ),a n dλ
0 is uniformly distributed over [0,1], We can thus normalize
the indexation by assuming, without loss of generality, that λ is uniformly
distributed over [0,1]. It follows that
F (a, ¯ w)=β (a, ¯ w),
which shows that β, hence α, can be non parametrically identiﬁed from the
quantiles of the conditional distribution of shares. Hence:
Proposition 2 Under assumptions M, CFS and I, the function α,w h i c h
gives the share of risky assets as a function of wealth and the parameter λ,
is exactly identiﬁed up to a normalization of the parametrization.
In words: while the shape of individual preferences was arbitrary without
the independence assumption, it is identiﬁed with it.
There are however two problems with the independence assumption. One
is that it is not testable: any observed distribution F can be rationalized
from well chosen preferences (i.e. functions α or β). Secondly, there exists
strong theoretical reasons to doubt it should hold. If some agents are less
risk averse than others, they will be more willing to hold risky portfolios or
engage into risky, entrepreneurial activities. If, as it can be expected, risk
is associated with higher expected returns, these agents should on average
end up being wealthier, although their distribution of wealth should be more
dispersed than among more risk averse investors. One can thus expect a
negative correlation between wealth and risk aversion. Clearly, however, the
theoretical argument just sketched says nothing on the magnitude of the
correlation, which remains an empirical issue.
3E m p i r i c a l s t r a t e g y
The main consequence of the previous argument is that in the absence of
speciﬁc (and untestable) assumptions on the joint distribution of preferences
9and wealth, panel data are needed to assess the form of individual preferences.
Clearly, with time variations our non identiﬁcation result does not hold. More
precisely, CRRA exhibits a property that is easy to test empirically; namely,
controlling for the ﬁnancial characteristics of the market portfolio, the share
of an individual wealth invested in risky assets should not vary with the
person’s wealth. Further, it follows from the previous arguments that if the
CRRA assumption is not rejected, then a cross sectional analysis may provide
an estimation of the joint distribution of wealth and risk aversion.
In practice, consider the approximation used by Friend and Blume (1975).
According to this model, and assuming no taxes and that all assets are liquid
and can be traded at no cost in any quantity, the optimal investment in risky
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Here, αh is the share of wealth invested in risky assets; γh is Pratt’s measure
of relative risk aversion, which is deﬁned as Wh,t [−U00 (Wh,t)/U0 (Wh,t)],a n d
can be interpreted as the wealth elasticity of the marginal utility of wealth;
rm and σ2
m denote the return and the variance of the return on the portfolio
of risky assets, and rf is the riskless interest rate. Given estimates of αh
and the market price for risk, (2) can be used to estimate the coeﬃcient of
relative risk aversion for investor h.
A ni m p o r t a n ta s p e c to f( 3 )i st h a tt h eﬁnancial characteristics of the risky
asset enter the log share additively. Empirically, the impact of aggregate
shocks aﬀecting the return and/or the variance of the risky portfolio can
therefore be captured through yearly dummy variables.
The main insight of the test is that if γh r e m a i n sc o n s t a n ta sWh,t varies,
so does αh. This is the basis for our econometric speciﬁcation, which relies
on the following discrete-time counterpart of (3):
log(αh,t)=β0 + β1 log(Wh,t)+β2Xh,t + uh + vh,t, (4)
where αh,t is investor’s h risky wealth share at time t; Wh,t is the sum of her
risky and riskless wealth; Xh,t is a vector of control variables; uh captures
any time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity in preferences, including risk
10aversion; and vh,t is a random disturbance uncorrelated with Wh,t, Xh,t and
uh. This framework is ﬂexible enough to allow for the diﬀerences in the
risky asset shares to reﬂect diﬀerences in preferences and in socioeconomic
characteristics.
In practice, the vector Xh,t consists of two types of controls. First, it
contains individuals’ speciﬁc (time-varying) characteristics that may aﬀect
the risky asset share as they proxy for changes in risk aversion, related for
example to life-cycle or changes in household composition. If they are cor-
related with changes in wealth, omitting such factors will result in biased
estimates of β1. Second, it includes a full set of time dummies that capture
aggregate shocks to wealth and asset prices.
The coeﬃcient β1 should be interpreted as the average elasticity of the
risky asset share to wealth over time. If households exhibit constant relative
risk aversion, this elasticity should be zero. Note, however, that, in the line
of the previous section, β1 cannot be estimated on cross sectional data. If
preferences for risk are heterogeneous and the heterogeneity is a function of
wealth (so that the distribution of uh is non degenerate and correlated with
Wh,t), then a regression of the type (4) performed on cross sectional data
yields a biased estimate of β1 because the cross-sectional error term uh+vh,t
is correlated with the regressor Wh,t.
Therefore, we take ﬁrst diﬀerence of equation (4) and focus on:
∆log(αh,t)=β1∆log(Wh,t)+β2∆Xh,t + ∆vh,t. (5)
Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences removes any observed and unobserved time-invariant
heterogeneity in preferences and individual characteristics. Then the esti-
mate of the β1 coeﬃcient is unbiased, which allows to consistently test the
CRRA assumption.
4D a t a
For the estimation we use data from the Survey of Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW), a large-scale household survey run every two years by the
Bank of Italy on a sample of about 8,000 Italian households.7 The SHIW is
available for several years and embraces at least two full business cycles. We
7This survey has been widely used in studies on saving behavior by Italian households.
See, among others, the essays in the volume edited by Ando et al. (1994).
11rely on the last 8 waves, which cover the period 1989-2004. Over that period,
the questionnaire contents, survey methodology and variable deﬁnition are
broadly homogeneous. The survey has a rotating panel component such that
about half of the observations refer to households that have been interviewed
in more than one year. The SHIW collects detailed information on Italian
households’ wealth, as well as portfolio allocation across a wide range of ﬁ-
nancial instruments, in addition to the standard set of socio-demographic and
economic characteristic. The Appendix contains a more detailed description
of the dataset and of the variables that we use in our study.
We deﬁne as risky assets the end-of-year holdings of stocks and shares,
corporate bonds and mutual funds at their market (self-reported) value. In
some instances we include also the value of business equity, which corresponds
to the market value of the business, ﬁrm or practice (including equipment,
stocks, goodwill, excluding land and buildings) of any household member.
We then compute total wealth by adding bank and post deposits and gov-
ernment security holdings to our measure of risky assets. Throughout most
of the analysis, we exclude home equity, whose impact is however discussed
in section 5.3. To ensure comparability over time, we express all variables in
euros and deﬂate them using the consumer price index based in 2004.8
Table I reports some descriptive statistics of the data. For our study
we use only those households who participate in the survey for at least two
adjacent years and who hold risky ﬁnancial assets both at t and at t − 1,
w h i c hl e a v e su sw i t ha nu n b a l a n c e dp a n e lo f3 , 7 8 5o b s e r v a t i o n so n1 , 3 3 2
households. It is evident from the comparison of the ﬁrst two columns of
the table that only a small fraction of households invest in risky assets and
that the share has increased sharply over the 1990s, which is consistent with
evidence presented in Guiso et al. (2002). Furthermore, among holders, over
the same period, risky ﬁnancial asset holdings have increased substantially
both in absolute value and as a share of total ﬁnancial assets. Since the end
of the 1990s, the average share has ﬂuctuated around 60 percent. Including
business equity in the deﬁnition of risky assets leads to a larger data set as
many business equity holders do not invest in other risky ﬁnancial assets. For
this sample, risky asset holdings are larger and have accounted for around 70
percent of total wealth in recent years. The last set of columns focuses on the
8Since there is no information about asset purchases and sales, we cannot distinguish be-
tween portfolio changes due to price changes and due to active investment/disinvestment.
The distinction might matter if one believed that household do not respond promptly to
capital gains and losses due to, for example, transaction costs or limited attention.
12few households holding both risky ﬁnancial assets and business equity. These
households are much wealthier and business equity absorbs over 50 percent
of their wealth and the share has been relatively constant over time. Their
risky ﬁnancial assets holdings (not reported in the Table I) have increased
over time and in recent years have accounted for almost 30 percent of wealth.
5 Results
5.1 Cross sectional analysis versus ﬁrst-diﬀerence re-
gression
Table II reports the results of the estimation of the regression in levels re-
ported in equation (4), with risky assets consisting of just risky ﬁnancial
instruments. Column (1) reports our baseline speciﬁcation, where we con-
trol only for aggregate shocks with year dummies. Standard errors are het-
eroskedasticity robust. If unbiased, the coeﬃcient on logWh,t would measure
the average elasticity of risky asset shares to wealth. Our estimate is posi-
tive and statistically signiﬁcant, implying a positive association between the
level of wealth and the share invested in risky assets. This result is robust to
the inclusion of a polynomial in the household’s head age and of family size,
reported in column (2), which are intended to capture life-cycle changes in
wealth and asset allocation.
However, as mentioned, if risk aversion is heterogeneous and negatively
correlated with wealth, failing to control for the heterogeneity results in a
positive bias in the estimation. Taking ﬁrst diﬀerences allows us to overcome
this problem.
Table III reports the results of the estimation of the model in ﬁrst-
diﬀerence in equation (5). In the regression in the ﬁrst column, the only
controls that we include are year dummies. The point estimate of the co-
eﬃcient of ∆logWh,t is small (half that in the cross sectional regression),
and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. In the speciﬁcation reported in the
second column of the table we include age and changes in family size. The
coeﬃcient of ∆logWh,t is unaﬀected. In columns (3) and (4), we verify the
robustness of our results by estimating the model on restricted samples of
observations. In column (3) we exclude the young, who might be subject to
liquidity constraints, and the elderly, whose portfolio behavior seems to be
quite diﬀerent from that of the rest, especially of the working population (see
13Hurd, 2001). We exclude also those with less than 5,000 euros of wealth (2
percent of the sample) and those whose risky asset share is below 3.5 per-
cent (1 percent of the sample), because changes in portfolio composition for
these households may be largely aﬀected by transaction costs. The estimated
elasticity decreases slightly, and remains statistically insigniﬁcant.
A natural concern, in this type of analysis, is that the absence of cor-
relation may, as suggested by Vissing-Jorgensen (2002), reﬂect inertia in
portfolio allocation, resulting from the absence of signiﬁc a n tv a r i a t i o ni nt h e
exogenous variable, coupled with ﬁxed transaction costs and/or measure-
ment errors. Assume most households in the sample experience little or no
p e r m a n e n ti n c o m ec h a n g e s ,s ot h a tm o s to b s e r v e di n c o m ev a r i a t i o nr e s u l t s
from minor and temporary shocks. In the presence of transaction costs, the
asset portfolio will not be adjusted, and the coeﬃcient of ∆logWh,t in our
regression is biased toward zero. One way of (partially) avoiding this problem
is to concentrate speciﬁcally on households experiencing signiﬁcant changes
in income. In column (4) we exclude household whose wealth changes by
less than 25 percent. Again, our results are unchanged, suggesting that peo-
ple who experience large income shocks do adjust their portfolio consistently
with the predictions of economic theory. In column (5) we verify whether
slow adjustments might bias our estimates by including in the regression the
lagged change in wealth, ∆logWh,t−1.T h e w e a l t h e ﬀects on portfolio allo-
cation remain statistically negligible. Finally, our results are robust to the
introduction of additional controls, such as interactions between the wealth
quartile dummies and the change in wealth.9
We conclude that on the sample of household holding a positive fraction
of their wealth under the form of risky ﬁnancial assets, the hypothesis of
constant relative risk aversion is not rejected by the data.
5.2 Net equity in private business
There are reasons to expect that business equity holdings may diﬀer from the
other risky assets in the portfolio. Private business equity is in general less
liquid and less divisible. Furthermore, there is evidence that those who hold
business equity tend to invest substantial amounts in a single privately held
ﬁrm and their portfolios are little diversiﬁed (see Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002).
9The regressions are available upon request.
14Tables IV and V repeat the analysis in levels and ﬁrst-diﬀerences using
a measure of risky wealth that includes the holdings of net equity in private
business. The estimation of the model in levels, reported in Table IV, points
towards a positive and statistically signiﬁcant relationship between wealth
and portfolio allocation. The estimated coeﬃcient is over three times that
from the regressions that do not include business equity, and the conclusion
is valid for both the whole sample and the restricted one that excludes the
young, the elderly and those with negligible wealth or with very small shares
of risky assets. Interestingly enough, the positive, statistically signiﬁcant
association remains when taking ﬁrst diﬀerences, with an estimated elasticity
of 0.077 for the whole sample and 0.109 for the restricted one (Table V,
columns 1 and 2).
It thus appears that when business equity is included, increases in net
wealth are associated with an augmentation of the share of risky assets in
t h ep o r t f o l i o .T h i sp o s i t i v ea n dl a r g ew e a l t he ﬀect can be read either as evi-
dence of decreasing relative risk aversion or as an illustration of the business
equity puzzle pointed out by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002). A
natural explanation of the puzzle relies on agents’ inability to adjust their
investment, due to the indivisibility of their business equity holding, its lack
of tradeability, or to the desire to keep a signiﬁcant fraction of the corre-
sponding property rights.
In order to check the validity of this explanation, we consider a subsample
of agents holding both business equity and ‘standard’ risky ﬁnancial assets.
The positive association remains, both in cross section and in ﬁrst diﬀerence,
although the point estimates are smaller (see column 3). More interestingly, if
we consider independently the share of business equity (column 4) and that of
risky ﬁnancial assets (column 5), we see that the positive correlation results in
fact from the aggregation of two opposite eﬀects. While the share of business
equity increases with wealth, the proportion of other risky assets decreases
signiﬁcantly. Part of the latter eﬀect may be attributed to ‘mechanical’
causes: a raise in total wealth increases the denominator of the ratio of
risky ﬁnancial assets to total wealth, hence tend to reduce the ratio even
if the numerator is not changed. However, the actual magnitude of the
change, as captured by the regression coeﬃcient, is about twice as large as
this mechanical eﬀect would imply.10 Our results thus support the second
10For agents holding both business and non business risky assets, the average share
of risky ﬁnancial assets to total wealth, is about 30%. Therefore a 1% increase in total
15story: agents who experience sudden variations in the value of their business
equity are indeed constrained by the illiquidity of their holdings, and tend to
compensate it (when possible) by readjusting in the opposite direction their
holdings of other risky assets.
Overall, the evidence in Table V seems to suggest that the wealth allo-
cation behavior of most business equity holders cannot be completely un-
derstood within the framework provided by our model: there is indeed a
business equity eﬀect, which seems mostly related to the illiquid nature of
these assets.
5.3 Housing and human capital
The inclusion of housing in the analysis raises various diﬃculties. In fact,
from a conceptual perspective, housing is more than a standard asset: it is
also a durable commodity providing consumption services. Furthermore, it
is to some extent illiquid and indivisible. Finally, even if housing is viewed as
an asset, the level of risk that should be associated with it is unclear. Real
estate risk is neither absent nor perfectly correlated among individuals; as
a consequence, the very deﬁnition of risky assets is delicate when housing
equity is taken into account.
Nevertheless, since housing is a very important component of privately-
held wealth and many households hold portfolios consisting of a house worth
several times their net worth, in Table VI we report two sets of results on data
that include housing and other real estate among wealth. In this instance,
total wealth is measured as the sum of all ﬁnancial assets and real estate net
of any debt for the purchase or restructuring of real estate. We carry out
our analysis on both the whole set of risky asset holders and on a restricted
sample, which excludes the young and the elderly and those with less than
30,000 euros of wealth (bottom 5 percent of the wealth distribution). The
ﬁrst two columns of Table VI report the regressions in levels, the other two are
based on ﬁrst diﬀerences. The estimated elasticities turn out to be negative,
large and signiﬁcant, which conﬁrms our concerns that investments in housing
and in real estate cannot be considered as non risky assets.
Another extension that we have considered concerns human capital. In-
cluding human capital in the analysis is not straightforward, for (at least)
wealth should inﬂate the ratio by .3 percentage point, while the (precisely estimated) eﬀect
reported in Table V is close to .6.
16two reasons. First, while the average return on human capital investment
has been often estimated, much less is known on the corresponding risk, and
especially about its correlation with ﬁnancial risks. Secondly, the approach
we use relies on the assumption that assets under consideration are freely
tradable, which hardly applies to human capital. This problem is standard
in the literature; existing approaches generally assume that human wealth is
riskless and freely tradable. Under these simplifying assumptions, equation
(2) applies to total wealth and the regression equations must be modiﬁed to
include a set of variables that allow for changes in the composition of human
and non-human wealth, along the lines of Brunnermeier and Nagel (2005).
This does not change our results.
5.4 The distribution of risk aversion
An interesting property of (3) is that the ﬁnancial characteristics of the port-
folio enter additively into the formula. If agents face the same market port-
folio, the log normalized excess return term log
E(rm−rf)
σ2
m is identical for all
households in any given year. It follows that for the set of households who
hold a positive fraction of their wealth in risky assets, the distribution of
logγh, the log of relative risk aversion, can be deduced from that of the log
share of risky assets through a shift in the mean. Equivalently, the distrib-




m . Moreover, one can test the stability of that distribution
over time.
Participation to ﬁnancial markets in Italy has been far from constant
over the period considered. The proportion of households in the sample who
invest a positive fraction of their wealth in risky ﬁnancial assets has increased
steadily from about 5 percent at the end of the 1980s, to over 20 percent at
the end of last decade. Since 2000, it has been fairly constant around 25
percent.11 This upward trend in participation has been recorded for several
other countries (see Guiso et al., 2002). A country-speciﬁc factor that has
contributed to this evolution is given by the large-scale privatizations that
started in 1993-94 and that have risen the stock market capitalization from
around 10 percent of GDP in 1993 to over 70 percent in 2000. Privatizations
11The participation rates are somewhat lower in our data which are drawn from a panel,
whose representativeness tend to diminish over time.
17were heavily advertised, which has lowered the information costs of stock
market investment and encouraged participation.
The rapid increase in the number of households holding risky ﬁnancial
assets in the 1990s is likely to have been associated to signiﬁcant changes in
the composition of the population of asset holders. However, the three waves
since 2000 seem pretty stationary. The distribution of log shares over the
period is given in Figure 1. We do indeed see a stabilization of the shape
after 2000; a Kolmogorov-Smirnof test does not reject the equality of the
distributions in 2000, 2002 and 2004. The distribution is neither normal
nor log normal (the distribution of the log is skewed). The corresponding
distribution of risk aversion is given by Figure 2.
This distribution has been rescaled, since it is estimated only up to a
multiplicative factor. As a rough calibration, we have taken the expected
excess return and volatility to be at their realization on the period, i.e.





This evidence should be considered with some caution. Dealing with
agents who invest only a small fraction of their ﬁnancial wealth in risky
assets is a diﬃcult exercise, because transaction costs may play a major role
in their case. Some results are indeed sensitive to the inclusion of these
individuals. For instance, the mean risk aversion in the population is at 4.2,
but only at 2.5 is we disregard agents with a share of risky assets smaller than
6%. Moreover, the opposite truncation may also take place. Almost no agent
has a ratio of risky assets larger than one, which may be reﬂect the presence
of borrowing constraint. The quantiles of the distribution are probably more
robust. The median is estimated at 1.7, irrespective of whether the holders of
small shares are included or not, and 25% of the population has a coeﬃcient
of relative risk aversion larger than 3.
6C o n c l u s i o n
Our paper is aimed at recovering information on preferences under uncer-
tainty from portfolio composition. We ﬁrst argue that cross sectional data
cannot provide information on the shape of individual preferences unless the
distribution of preferences is assumed to be independent of wealth. From a
theoretical perspective, the independence assumption is ad hoc, non testable,
and unlikely to hold because the less risk averse investors are likely to receive
18higher returns on average, hence accumulate more wealth. However, theory
has little to say on the expected magnitude of the correlation: this remains
an empirical issue.
Our second claim is that the use of panel data allows precisely to disen-
tangle the two issues at stake - i.e., the shape of individual preferences and
the correlation between preferences and wealth. A simple regression in ﬁrst
diﬀerences allows to test for constant relative risk aversion: this property is
not rejected. Then, cross sectional regressions allow to estimate the joint
distribution of wealth and preferences. Based on these, we reach two main
conclusions. First, the distribution of risk aversion is widely heterogeneous.
Our calibration suggests that the median of the distribution of relative risk
aversion could be slightly smaller than 2; however, a fourth of the population
is found to exhibit a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion larger than 3.I t
should however be noted that the ratio under consideration is that of risky
assets within the agents’ ﬁnancial wealth. The inclusion of other sources
of wealth (housing, human capital) generates speciﬁc problems. Neverthe-
less, such a change may signiﬁcantly reduce the ratio of risky assets, hence
increase our risk aversion estimates. Secondly, the correlation between risk
aversion and wealth is signiﬁcantly negative but quantitatively small (our es-
timates imply a correlation between wealth and share of risky assets equal to
0.05). Hence the estimates obtained in previous, cross sectional works, which
implicitly relied on an independence assumption regarding the joint distrib-
ution of wealth and risk aversion, probably provided good approximations of
the true distribution.
Data Appendix
The Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) col-
lects detailed data on demographics, households’ consumption, income and
balance sheet items. The survey was ﬁrst run in the mid-60s but has been
available on tape only since 1984. Over time, it has gone through a number of
changes in sample size and design, sampling methodology and questionnaire.
However, sampling methodology, sample size and the broad contents of the
information collected have been unchanged since 1989. The survey is bian-
nual with the exception of the 1998 wave which was run three years after the
previous one. Each wave surveys a representative sample of the Italian resi-
dent population and covers about 8,000 households. Sampling occurs in two
19stages, ﬁrst at municipality level and then at household level. Municipalities
are divided into 51 strata deﬁned by 17 regions and 3 classes of population
size (more than 40,000, 20,000 to 40,000, less than 20,000). Households are
then randomly selected from registry oﬃce records. They are deﬁned as
groups of individuals related by blood, marriage or adoption and sharing the
same dwelling. The head of the household is conventionally identiﬁed with
the husband, if present. If instead the person who would usually be consid-
ered the head of the household works abroad or was absent at the time of
the interview, the head of the household is taken to be the person responsi-
ble for managing the household’s resources. The net response rate (ratio of
responses to households contacted net of ineligible units) was 57 percent in
the 1995 wave. Brandolini and Cannari (1994) present a detailed discussion
of sample design, attrition, and other measurement issues and compare the
SHIW variables with the corresponding aggregate quantities.
Construction and deﬁnition of the variables
All wealth variables refer to the household as a whole and are self reported,
end of year, market values. Risky ﬁnancial wealth is deﬁned as the sum
of corporate bonds, investment funds, Italian shares of listed and unlisted
companies and partnerships, managed savings, foreign securities and loans
to cooperatives. Total ﬁnancial wealth is given by risky ﬁnancial assets plus
bank and post oﬃce deposits, certiﬁcates of deposits, Italian government
bills and bonds. The value of business equity is reported if: a) any member
of the household reports to be a member of profession, a sole proprietor,
a free lance, a contingent worker employed on none account, or if they are
employed in a business owned in whole or in part by members of the house-
hold (all ﬁgures then refer to the household’s ownership share), or if they
are active shareholders or partners in a ﬁrm; and if: b) they report that the
ﬁrm possesses machinery, equipment or other capital goods or other assets
(e.g. licences and patents) with a market value. In these instances they are
asked to report the market value of the ﬁrm (including equipment, stocks,
goodwill, excluding land and buildings) or the market value of their share for
partners and active shareholders. Finally, the value of real estate is given by
the self reported market value of the principal residence, of other dwellings,
buildings, agricultural and non-agricultural land. Information on total end
of year outstanding debt are also available.
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Table I: Descriptive statistics 
 SHIW 
panel 
  Holders of risky 
financial assets 
  Holders of risky financial assets and/or 
business equity 
Holders of risky financial 
assets and business equity 


















1989 2,187  93  17  61  0.30  351  90  120  0.70 18  122  0.50 
    (24)  (74)  (0.22)    (342)  (357)  (0.31)    (201)  (0.30) 
1991 4,607  205  32  71  0.34  659  108  136  0.69 39  220  0.65 
    (71)  (99)  (0.24)    (171)  (186)  (0.31)    (267)  (0.27) 
1993 4,536  299  55  102  0.45  746  142  173  0.66 58  411  0.58 
    (136)  (153)  (0.27)    (455)  (465)  (0.31)    (954)  (0.28) 
1995 4,018  368  51  102  0.45  766  94  129  0.64 60  120  0.45 
    (116)  (149)  (0.29)    (168)  (196)  (0.31)    (149)  (0.29) 
1998 4,662  637  64  96  0.60 1,032  122  152  0.66  106  283  0.50 
    (128)  (150)  (0.27)    (418)  (432)  (0.28)    (1,007)  (0.31) 
2000 4,887  823  56  85  0.63 1,190  112  139  0.69  140  257  0.51 
    (117)  (150)  (0.27)    (367)  (379)  (0.27)    (724)  (0.31) 
2002 4,687  798  47  75  0.62 1,164  110  135  0.69  141  264  0.55 
    (95)  (153)  (0.26)    (267)  (285)  (0.27)    (503)  (0.32) 
2004 3,604  562  50  77  0.63  833  122  146  0.71 98  307  0.57 
    (115)  (146)  (0.26)    (382)  (407)  (0.26)    (845)  (0.28) 
Total 33,188 3,785  52  85  0.57 6,741  114  142  0.68 660  265  0.53 
    (113)  (147)  (0.28)    (340)  (356)  (0.29)    (722)  (0.30) 
Note: The number of observations refers to the number of households in the survey who are interviewed also in the previous and/or in the 
following survey. Amounts are in thousands of 2004 euros. Averages and standard deviations (in parenthesis) of individual values, per year. 
Total wealth in (b) consists of risky and riskless financial assets; total wealth in (d) consists of risky and riskless financial assets plus business 
equity. 
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Table II: OLS regressions of wealth shares in risky financial assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
  All All Restricted 
sample 
Large changes  Lagged 
changes 
log (Wh,t)  0.035*** 0.036*** 0.010  0.043*** 0.040*** 
  (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Year  1991  0.115 0.112 0.077 0.176 0.194 
  (0.109) (0.109) (0.123) (0.118) (0.158) 
Year  1993  0.415*** 0.411*** 0.278**  0.411*** 0.460*** 
  (0.101) (0.102) (0.115) (0.112) (0.150) 
Year  1995  0.361*** 0.359*** 0.316*** 0.368*** 0.419*** 
  (0.104) (0.105) (0.111) (0.117) (0.151) 
Year  1998  0.800*** 0.796*** 0.671*** 0.839*** 0.830*** 
  (0.094) (0.094) (0.101) (0.102) (0.142) 
Year  2000  0.896*** 0.891*** 0.779*** 0.960*** 0.917*** 
  (0.092) (0.093) (0.099) (0.100) (0.141) 
Year  2002  0.894*** 0.887*** 0.737*** 0.959*** 0.908*** 
  (0.091) (0.092) (0.100) (0.099) (0.141) 
Year  2004  0.895*** 0.888*** 0.753*** 0.981*** 0.849*** 
  (0.093) (0.093) (0.102) (0.101) (0.142) 
Age -  0.022***  0.010  0.021**  0.013 
    (0.008) (0.019) (0.009) (0.008) 
Age
2/100 -  -0.021***  -0.010  -0.021**  -0.013* 
    (0.007) (0.021) (0.009) (0.008) 
Family size  -  -0.021*  -0.030**  -0.010  -0.034** 
    (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Constant  -1.877*** -2.346*** -1.614*** -2.487*** -2.111*** 
  (0.160) (0.248) (0.436) (0.296) (0.281) 
Observations 3,785  3,785 2,216 2,712 2,347 
R-squared  0.12 0.12 0.12 0.14 0.11 
Note: The left-hand-side variable is the (log) share of wealth invested in risky financial assets. Column (3) is based on a 
sample that excludes those households whose head is aged less than 25 or over 60, whose wealth is less than 5,000 
euros and whose risky asset share is less than 3.5 percent. Column (4) is based on a sample that excludes those whose 
wealth changes by less than 25 percent. ‘Family size’ denotes the number of persons (adults and children) in the 
household. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   26
Table III: OLS regressions of changes in the wealth shares in risky financial assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All  All  Restricted 
sample 
Large changes  Lagged 
changes 
∆log (Wh,t)  0.017 0.017 0.012 0.019 0.040 
  (0.023) (0.022) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) 
∆log (Wh,t-1)  - - - -  0.011 
      (0.025) 
Year 1993  0.339***  0.339***  0.297*  0.322**  - 
  (0.123) (0.123) (0.152) (0.129)  
Year  1995  0.074 0.074 0.121 0.084 -0.413** 
  (0.114) (0.114) (0.143) (0.127) (0.182) 
Year  1998  0.488*** 0.492*** 0.391*** 0.401*** -0.017 
  (0.120) (0.120) (0.144) (0.132) (0.179) 
Year  2000  0.081 0.082 0.140 0.018 -0.332* 
  (0.104) (0.104) (0.126) (0.106) (0.173) 
Year 2002  0.020  0.025  0.037  -0.044  -0.400** 
  (0.103) (0.103) (0.126) (0.105) (0.168) 
Year  2004  0.034 0.047 0.084 0.001 -0.452*** 
  (0.102) (0.103) (0.127) (0.104) (0.168) 
Age -  0.029***  0.043  0.036**  -0.005 
    (0.011) (0.030) (0.014) (0.013) 
Age
2/100  -  -0.029*** -0.044  -0.035*** 0.000 
    (0.010) (0.033) (0.013) (0.012) 
Family size up  -  -0.015  0.082  -0.048  -0.133 
    (0.093) (0.088) (0.120) (0.117) 
Family size down  -  0.092*  0.012  0.084  0.061 
    (0.054) (0.089) (0.074) (0.067) 
Constant  -0.016  -0.702** -1.058  -0.864** 0.676* 
  (0.098) (0.307) (0.686) (0.391) (0.401) 
Observations 2,424  2,424 1,392 1,620 1,063 
R-squared  0.03 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 
Note: The left-hand-side variable is the change in the (log) share of wealth invested in risky financial assets. Column (3) is 
based on a sample that excludes those households whose head is aged less than 25 or over 60, whose wealth is less than 
5,000 euros and whose risky asset share is less than 3.5 percent. Column (4) is based on a sample that excludes those whose 
wealth changes by less than 25 percent. ‘Family size up’ and ‘Family size down’ are dummies that take on value 1 if the 
number of persons (adults and children) in the household increases or decreases between t-1 and t. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   27
Table IV: OLS regressions of wealth shares in business equity and /or risky financial assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All  Restricted 
sample 
Business equity holders with 
some risky financial assets 
  LHS: tot. risky 
wealth share 
LHS: tot. risky 
wealth share 




LHS: fin. risky 
wealth share 
log (Wh,t)  0.114*** 0.130*** 0.065*** 0.165*** -0.309*** 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.021) (0.046) 
Year  1991  -0.034 -0.006 0.160* 0.151  0.028 
  (0.050) (0.050) (0.082) (0.143) (0.355) 
Year  1993  -0.065 -0.057 0.099  -0.090 0.497 
  (0.048) (0.050) (0.088) (0.149) (0.320) 
Year 1995  -0.138***  -0.087*  0.026  -0.223  0.631** 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.094) (0.157) (0.308) 
Year  1998  -0.018 -0.037 0.196**  -0.071 0.621** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.079) (0.137) (0.299) 
Year 2000  0.076*  0.054  0.215***  -0.078  0.786*** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.077) (0.134) (0.284) 
Year 2002  0.094**  0.046  0.204***  -0.011  0.596** 
  (0.045) (0.045) (0.077) (0.131) (0.285) 
Year  2004  0.147*** 0.101**  0.210*** 0.020  0.691** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.078) (0.135) (0.286) 
Age  -0.001 -0.015 -0.004 -0.029 -0.013 
  (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.019) (0.032) 
Age
2/100  -0.005  0.013 0.002 0.017 0.034 
  (0.005) (0.012) (0.008) (0.019) (0.031) 
Family size  0.030***  0.018**  0.002 0.034 -0.106** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.030) (0.053) 
Constant  -1.768*** -1.583*** -1.027*** -1.771*** 1.382 
  (0.148) (0.236) (0.218) (0.505) (0.955) 
Observations  6,741 4,455 555  555  555 
R-squared  0.06 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.16 
Note: The left-hand-side variable of the regressions of columns (1) through (3) is the (log) share of wealth invested in 
business equity and/or risky financial assets. The left-hand-side variable of the regressions of columns (4) and (5) is the 
(log) share of wealth invested in business equity and the (log) share of wealth invested in risky financial assets, 
respectively. Column (2) is based on a sample that excludes those households whose head is aged less than 25 or over 
60, whose wealth is less than 5,000 euros and whose risky asset share is less than 3.5 percent. Columns (3) through (5) 
are based on a sample that excludes those without risky financial assets, those whose business equity holdings amount 
to less than 5000 euros and whose business equity share is less than 5 percent. ‘Family size’ denotes the number of 
persons (adults and children) in the household. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table V: OLS regressions of changes in the wealth shares in business equity and/or risky 
financial assets 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All  Restricted 
sample 
Business equity holders with 
some risky financial assets 
  LHS: tot. risky 
wealth share 
LHS: tot. risky 
wealth share 




LHS: fin. risky 
wealth share 
∆log (Wh,t)  0.077*** 0.109*** 0.064*** 0.226*** -0.543*** 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.016) (0.045) (0.088) 
Year 1993  0.044  0.008  -0.209**  -0.432**  0.777 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.088) (0.219) (0.541) 
Year  1995  0.013  -0.012 -0.253***  -0.282 0.167 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.092) (0.208) (0.455) 
Year 1998  0.131**  0.043  -0.064  -0.285  0.165 
  (0.063) (0.060) (0.104) (0.246) (0.491) 
Year 2000  0.064  0.071  -0.155**  -0.262  0.218 
  (0.052) (0.051) (0.075) (0.201) (0.438) 
Year 2002  0.021  0.004  -0.177**  -0.046  -0.178 
  (0.051) (0.049) (0.077) (0.189) (0.430) 
Year 2004  0.074  0.061  -0.167**  -0.083  0.083 
  (0.051) (0.050) (0.076) (0.188) (0.422) 
Age  0.017**  0.015 0.004 0.004 -0.033 
  (0.007) (0.016) (0.012) (0.031) (0.053) 
Age
2/100 -0.018**  -0.015  -0.005  0.000  0.012 
  (0.007) (0.018) (0.011) (0.031) (0.050) 
Family size up  -0.043  0.036 -0.114  0.078 -0.189 
  (0.057) (0.053) (0.169) (0.317) (0.542) 
Family size down  0.018 -0.036  0.003 0.086 0.045 
  (0.040) (0.049) (0.050) (0.136) (0.234) 
Constant  -0.408**  -0.374 0.098  -0.105 1.368 
  (0.186) (0.345) (0.320) (0.792) (1.426) 
Observations 4,354  2,853  332  332  332 
R-squared  0.02 0.03 0.08 0.12 0.18 
Note: The left-hand-side variable of the regressions of columns (1) through (3) is the change in the (log) share of wealth 
invested in risky financial assets. The left-hand-side variable of the regressions of columns (4) and (5) is the change in the 
(log) share of wealth invested in business equity and the change in the (log) share of wealth invested in risky financial 
assets, respectively. Column (2) is based on a sample that excludes those households whose head is aged less than 25 or over 
60, whose wealth is less than 5,000 euros and whose risky asset share is less than 3.5 percent. Columns (3) through (5) are 
based on a sample that excludes those without risky financial assets, those whose business equity holdings amount to less 
than 5000 euros and whose business equity share is less than 5 percent. ‘Family size up’ and ‘Family size down’ are 
dummies that take on value 1 if the number of persons (adults and children) in the household increases or decreases between 
t-1 and t. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   29
Table VI: Regressions with housing wealth 
  (1) (3) (2) (4) 
  Regressions in levels  Regressions in 1
st differences 
  All  Restricted sample  All  Restricted sample 
log (Wh,t) -0.022***  -0.036***  -  - 
  (0.006) (0.004)    
∆log (Wh,t)  - -  -0.082***  -0.078*** 
    (0.010)  (0.010) 
Year 1991  0.022**  0.040***  -  - 
  (0.011) (0.012)    
Year  1993  0.028*** 0.042*** -0.003  -0.020* 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Year  1995  0.039*** 0.060*** 0.004  -0.013 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.012) 
Year  1998  0.054*** 0.065*** -0.019  -0.032** 
  (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) 
Year  2000  0.070*** 0.092*** -0.008  -0.016 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.013) 
Year  2002  0.055*** 0.086*** -0.039***  -0.047*** 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013) 
Year  2004  0.086*** 0.102*** 0.017*  -0.013 
  (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Age -0.004***  -0.007**  0.001  -0.005 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Age
2/100  0.001 0.005 -0.001  0.006 
  (0.001) (0.004) (0.001) (0.005) 
Family size  0.013***  0.012***  -  - 
  (0.002) (0.002)    
Family size up  -  -  0.033*  0.025 
    (0.018)  (0.018) 
Family size down  -  -  0.008  0.001 
    (0.008)  (0.010) 
Constant  0.247*** 0.485*** -0.013  0.141 
  (0.070) (0.091) (0.048) (0.108) 
Observations  23,905 11,610 16,463 7,825 
R-squared  0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
Note: In columns (1) and (3), the left-hand-side variable is the (log) share of wealth invested in risky financial assets 
plus real estate. In columns (2) and (4), the left-hand-side variable is the change in the (log) share of wealth invested in 
risky financial assets plus real estate. Columns (2) and (4) are based on a sample that excludes those households whose 
head is aged less than 25 or over 60, whose wealth is less than 30,000 euros and whose risky asset share is less than 3.5 
percent. ‘Family size’ denotes the number of persons (adults and children) in the household. ‘Family size up’ and 
‘Family size down’ are dummies that take on value 1 if the number of persons (adults and children) in the household 
increases or decreases between t-1 and t. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%.   30
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Note: Households whose risky asset share is less than 6 percent (3.5 percent of the sample) and those holding business equity have 
been excluded from the sample. The histograms are based on 64, 135, 208, 276, 465, 614, 611 and 412 observations, respectively. 
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Note: The relative risk aversion estimates are based on the assumption that the equity premium is 0.04 and the standard deviation of 
stock returns are around 0.2. Households whose risky asset share is less than 6 percent (3.5 percent of the sample) and those holding 
business equity have been excluded from the sample. The histograms are based on 64, 135, 208, 276, 465, 614, 611 and 412 
observations, respectively. 